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4EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Eminent Domain is the power of the government or quasi-government entities to take private or 
public property interests through condemnation. Eminent Domain has been a significant issue since 
1879 when, in the case of Boom Company v. Patterson, the Supreme Court first acknowledged that 
the power of eminent domain may be delegated by state legislatures to agencies and non-govern-
mental entities.1  Thus, the era of legal takings began.
Though an important legal dispute then, more recently eminent domain has blossomed into an en-
during contentious social and political problem throughout the United States. The Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution states, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.” Thus, in the wake of the now infamous decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 
where the Court upheld the taking of private property for purely economic benefit as a “public 
use,” the requirement of “just compensation” stands as the primary defender of constitutionally 
protected liberty under the federal constitution.  In response to Kelo, many state legislatures passed 
a variety of eminent domain reforms specifically tailoring what qualifies as a public use and how just 
compensation should be calculated.3
 
Texas landowners recognize that the state’s population is growing at a rapid pace. There is an 
increasing need for more land and resources such as energy and transportation. But, private prop-
erty rights are equally important, especially in Texas, and must be protected as well. Eminent do-
main and the condemnation process is not a willing buyer and willing seller transition; it is a legally 
forced sale. Therefore, it is necessary to consider further improvements to the laws that govern the 
use of eminent domain so Texas landowners can have more assurance that this process is fair and 
respectful of their private property rights when they are forced to relinquish their land.
This report compiles statutes and information from the other forty-nine states to illustrate how they 
address key eminent domain issues. Further, this report endeavors to provide a neutral third voice 
in Texas to strike a more appropriate balance between individual’s property rights and the need 
for increased economic development. This report breaks down eminent domain into seven major 
topics that, in addition to Texas, seemed to be similar in many of the other states. These categories 
are: (1) Awarding of Attorneys’ Fee; (2) Compensation and Valuation; (3) Procedure Prior to Suit; (4) 
Condemnation Procedure; (5) What Cannot be Condemned; (6) Public Use & Authority to Condemn; 
and (7) Abandonment. In analyzing these seven categories, this report does not seek to advance a 
particular interest but only to provide information on how Texas law differs from other states. This 
report lays out trends seen across other states that are either similar or dissimilar to Texas, and ad-
ditionally, discusses interesting and unique laws employed by other states that may be of interest to 
Texas policy makers. Our research found three dominant categories which tend to be major issues 
across the country: (1) the awarding of attorneys’ fees; (2) the valuation and measurement of just 
compensation; and (3) procedure prior to suit. 
5ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Texas currently only allows attorneys’ fees to be paid if the condemnor does not follow the proper 
procedure in making a bona fide offer to the property owner. This is one of the stricter approaches 
taken, as forty other States award attorneys’ fees on a variety of additional bases. From the outset, 
landowners are in a precarious position when a taking is initiated. The law entitles a landowner to 
the taken property’s “market price,” but who pays for the appraisal? Who pays for an attorney to 
review the paperwork? Under current law, that is left entirely to the landowner. Landowners who 
challenge just compensation are often never made whole when their property is taken for public 
use because any amount they receive will be reduced by the fees needed to win the suit. 
COMPENSATION AND VALUATION
There are two dominant approaches adopted by states regarding valuation of land to be condemned. 
Texas, along with twenty-eight other states, uses a Broad Instruction Approach. This approach pro-
vides minimal guidance on what just compensation should be based on. The appointed Special Com-
missioners have considerable discretion in determining the land valuation without any specific factors 
that they must follow. The other dominant approach, taken by seventeen states, is a Factor Based 
Approach. This approach specifically lays out what considerations should be followed by the court in 
determining the fair market value of the land. By specifically laying out the factors to be followed, this 
approach ensures that relevant information is considered in every condemnation case.
PROCEDURE PRIOR TO SUIT
A variety of different nuances exist amongst the states in the procedure prior to suit. Most, includ-
ing Texas, adhere to a general pattern of negotiation between the landowner and condemnor fol-
lowed by a determination of value using an appraiser. While current law requires a bona fide offer, 
it may be of interest to the legislature to better specify, in statute, what “bona fide” really means. 
Several states allow recovery of costs and fees if the condemnor does not follow the appropriate 
procedure. This could be beneficial as it would help offset costs for a landowner who wishes to con-
tinue with litigation. A few states even go as far as to allow the proceedings to be dismissed if the 
condemnor does not follow the appropriate statutory pre-suit requirements.
Each section will provide a greater understanding of the variances between Texas Eminent Domain 
Law and the individual states. With this information, policy makers should be able to appropriately 
determine national trends that could provide opportunities for Texas to refine existing eminent 
domain law. All policy conclusions contained in this report were derived from explicit state statutes, 
regulations, and constitutions. Specific case law or judicial interpretation of these statutes is beyond 
the scope of this report.
6INTRODUCTION
FINDING A SPACE FOR COMPETING INTERESTS
Although the American economy has struggled at times in recent years, the Texas economy has 
generally continued to grow at a rapid pace and diversified as it has grown. And while the state has 
historically been known as an oil and gas haven, the Bureau of Economic Analysis has noted that the 
largest industry segment in Texas is finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing.4  Even though 
this segment contributed the most to the state’s gross domestic product (GDP)5, the industry seg-
ment accounted for only 13.7% of the Texas’ total GDP.  The Texas economy is no longer dependent 
on one particular market or industry.
This success in economic diversity has brought challenges. The Texas population grew by almost half a 
million residents between July 2014 and July 2015,6 and economic growth has created an influx of resi-
dents to urban areas. During the same period, Houston, San Antonio, Fort Worth, Dallas, and Austin 
were among the ten cities with the largest increase in residents for a combined total of approximately 
128,000 individuals, excluding surrounding suburban areas.7  The state population is expected to con-
tinue the trend upward. New residents create a demand for new roads, power resources, and water 
resources. In addition to these infrastructure needs, two new shale fields, known as the Alpine High 
and Wolfcamp, have recently been found to hold a wealth of reservoirs.8  So, Texas infrastructure must 
meet the demand of a growing population and growth in the oil and gas industry. 
These infrastructure demands shine a spotlight on eminent domain law because more people and 
more oil and gas activity require more roads, more pipelines, and more power lines. However, these 
roads, pipelines, and power lines often cross miles and miles of open Texas countryside—the vast 
majority of which is owned by private Texas citizens. The state must strike a balance between the 
rights of the private landowner and the general public good. While residents of Dallas may benefit 
immensely from infrastructure features like a high-speed rail to Houston, there are families with 
heritage farms who may not wish to let the high-speed train run through their land. As the Legisla-
ture stands poised to consider eminent domain law again in 2017, this report seeks to provide help-
ful information on the current state of eminent domain law in Texas and across the United States. 
This report does not seek to advance a particular interest, but endeavors to provide an objective 
resource to the 85th Texas Legislature and policymakers to aid in the review of current laws pertain-
ing to eminent domain. The students of Texas A&M University School of Law (“TAMU Law”) have 
conducted nationwide research to benchmark Texas law and determine national trends, allowing 
the Legislature to consider opportunities to modify Texas law. 
The policy features and conclusions contained in this report are based solely upon the language of 
respective state statutes, regulations, and constitutions. Court decisions of particular jurisdictions 
interpreting statutory language are beyond the scope of this report.
7This whitepaper examines each of several overarching topics relevant to eminent domain law across 
the country. For each topic, this paper will briefly discuss current Texas law, and then will discuss the 
state of eminent domain law in the other forty-nine states, highlighting significant similarities and 
differences. Finally, this white paper will briefly discuss a sampling of unique or interesting laws that 
highlight the fact that each state often faces its own distinct challenges with respect to eminent 
domain law, and crafts a solution that works best for that state. 
8THE CONDEMNATION PROCESS IN TEXAS
The Texas Constitution declares that “No person’s property shall be taken...for a public use without 
adequate compensation . . . and only if the taking is for the State . . . or the public at large; or an 
entity granted the power of eminent domain under law.”9
Property can only be taken for a “public use” defined by the Texas Constitution as the “ownership, 
use, and enjoyment of the property,” by the government or another entity granted eminent domain 
power. Texas, like most states, does not specifically codify in one location entities with eminent do-
main power. The Texas Comptroller’s office does, however, maintain an updated list of the entities 
who have applied for, and currently have, eminent domain authority.10  The definition of “public use” 
encompasses condemnation of the property to eliminate urban blight, but transferring property to a 
private party for economic development or enhancement of tax revenue is not “public use” in Texas.11 
Once a piece of property is deemed necessary for a public use, Texas condemnation procedure is 
represented by three phases: (1) negotiation between the condemnor and the property owner; (2) 
the special commissioners’ hearing and award of damages; and if either party is dissatisfied with the 
commissioners’ award; (3) an appeal through a civil condemnation suit. Texas law strongly favors 
negotiation between the eminent domain entity and the landowner. To this end, the law requires 
an eminent domain entity to make a “bona fide” offer to the property owner. To fulfill this re-
quirement, the condemnor must make an initial offer in writing to the landowner and obtain the 
property value via a written appraisal from a certified appraiser. Then, the condemnor must wait at 
least thirty days from the initial offer to provide the landowner with a final written offer equal to or 
greater than the appraisal. The final offer must also include a copy of the written appraisal, a copy 
of the deed or easement sought to be acquired, and the Landowner’s Bill of Rights.12  If the condem-
nor and the landowner cannot agree on the property value, the condemnor may file a condemna-
tion petition in the county where the property is located.13 
Once the petition is filed, the court appoints three special commissioners, who are disinterested 
landowners residing in the county, to assess the property value and any property damages. Then, 
the commissioners schedule a hearing and notify all interested parties. At the hearing, the commis-
sioners determine the property value and damages to be paid in light of testimony and evidence 
presented. If either party disagrees with the commissioners’ findings, they can file an objection with 
the court, which initiates a civil condemnation suit.14 
In order to proceed to the condemnation suit, the objecting party must file a written statement on 
or before the first Monday following the twentieth day after the commissioners filed their findings 
with the court. Once this objection is timely filed, the court will try the case like any other civil mat-
9ter. The judge decides whether the condemnor has the power to condemn and the jury determines 
damages, if a jury trial is requested; otherwise, the judge determines damages. The condemnation 
suit is a fresh slate, meaning no evidence of the prior special commissioners’ hearing, including the 
final award, is admissible in the condemnation suit.15 
The special commissioners, and perhaps later a jury, assess the landowner’s just compensation based 
on the evidence presented. If an entire tract or parcel of real property is condemned, the damage to 
the landowner is defined as the “local market value of the property at the time of the special com-
missioners’ hearing.”16  If only a portion of the tract or parcel is condemned, the landowner’s com-
pensation is the market value of the portion condemned plus damages to the remaining property. 
To determine damages, the commissioners consider both the particular injuries and benefits to the 
property owner, but not injuries or benefits in common with the local community (e.g., a change in 
property values because of the condemnation).17
Each party in the civil condemnation suit is respon-
sible for their own attorneys’ fees18, except for 
particular circumstances laid out in the property 
code. A landowner may collect attorneys’ fees and 
other litigation expenses if the condemnor: (1) 
does not follow proper procedure in making the 
“bona fide offer,” as described in the Tex. Prop. 
Code § 21.0113; (2) moves to dismiss the condem-
nation proceedings; lacks authority to condemn 
the property, resulting in dismissal of proceeding; 
or (3) dismisses the proceeding and subsequently 
attempts to condemn essentially the same property a second time. Upon a second attempt, the con-
demnor must pay the original commissioners’ award plus triple the landowner’s original expenses.19  
A figure explaining the eminent domain process in Texas is given on the following page. 
Photo credit: Tave Doty
10
Eminent Domain 
Process in Texas 
Figure 1
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landowner prevails in inverse condemnation
landowner defeats condemnation in whole or in part
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STATE LAW COMPARISONS
LANDOWNER’S ATTORNEYS’ FEES
States that award attorneys’ fees when the landowner recovers more than the condemnor originally 
offered encourage eminent domain entities in those states to make a fair offer to the landowner at 
the outset. Further, such a provision ensures that landowners are made whole throughout the entire 
condemnation process. Texas allows attorneys’ fees in limited circumstances to enforce compliance 
with proper condemnation procedure. Texas does not, however, award attorneys’ fees when the 
landowner recovers more than the condemnor originally offered.
Many states allow landowners to recover attorneys’ fees in a condemnation action if the amount 
awarded by a court or jury exceeds a threshold value. For example, Alaska’s statute allows recovery 
of costs and attorneys’ fees if a jury awards at least 10% more than the amount awarded at the 
“Master’s Hearing” (a process similar to Texas’ commissioners’ hearing).20  The following chart sum-
marizes the attorneys’ fee thresholds in various states.
A number of other states also use attorneys’ fees as an incentive for condemnors to use their emi-
nent domain power judiciously. Some states award attorneys’ fe s when a landowner prevails over 
a condemnor for any reason.38  Other states award attor ys’ fe s when the condemnor lacks the 
authority to condemn the property at issue,39 or when all or part of the property at issue cannot be 
acquired through a condemnation proceeding.40  Finally, as in Texas, a number of states award at-
torneys’ fees to the landowner if the condemnation proceeding is abandoned or dismissed.41
Attorneys’ Fees 
Thresholds
Attorneys’ FeeS 
Awarded
110% of condemnor’s offer
115% of condemnor’s offer
120% of condemnor’s offer
130% of condemnor’s offer
amount over condemnor’s offer
closer to land owner’s value than 
condemor’s attested value of property
condemnor lacked authority to condemn
landowner prevails in inverse condemnation
landowner defeats condemnation in whole or in part
Figure 2
Figure 3
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Many states have procedural hurdles that a condemnor must clear before taking possession of the 
property at issue. In some states, attorneys’ fees are awarded to a landowner if the court finds that 
a condemnor improperly took possession of the property at issue.42  These statutes indirectly protect 
landowners by ensuring that condemnors follow proper procedure to take property, tend to make the 
condemnor more cautious about using eminent domain, and encourage negotiation over litigation. 
A handful of states award attorneys’ fees based on a much more fact-intensive inquiry than compar-
ing a condemnor’s offer to a jury’s final award. For instance, a few states—Wyoming, Oregon, and 
Missouri43—attempt to enforce good-faith negotiation by awarding attorneys’ fees if the court finds 
a lack of good faith during negotiations. Similarly, California courts may award attorneys’ fees if 
they find that a condemnor’s offer was unreasonable while the landowner’s was reasonable, in light 
of the amount of the final judgment.44  
Alternatively, some states award attorneys’ fees as a matter of course, or at the discretion of the 
presiding judge. Florida awards based on benefits achieved for the landowner;45 Illinois awards 
at the judge’s discretion to reimburse the property owner;46 New Hampshire awards are currently 
awarded to the prevailing party, but see proposed legislation that would award to the property 
owner if the jury award for just compensation is 120% of the final offer made by the condemning 
entity;47 North Dakota awards according to the judge’s discretion an amount sufficient to reimburse 
the property owner;48 Ohio awards attorneys’ fees any time a state agency initiates a condemnation 
proceeding;49 Pennsylvania awards up to $4,000 if a property is condemned in fee simple, and up to 
$1,000 if the property is condemned as an easement for water or sewage lines.50  Several states have 
unique qualifications for awarding attorney fees, for example:
•	 In Arizona, courts award attorneys’ fees if property is taken for a non-public use, or when 
a jury awards more than a municipality’s final offer in an urban blight condemnation 
case.51 
•	 In Delaware, if two-thirds of the property owners in a project area along a private beach 
have allowed the Department of Natural Resources to initiate a project, the Secretary can 
initiate condemnation proceedings against the remainder of the project area, and the Sec-
retary may include an award of attorneys’ fees when determining the total project costs of 
obtaining an interest in the properties to be acquired.52 
•	 In Mississippi, courts award attorneys’ fees when a condemnor fails to pay the landowner’s 
damages within ninety days of a final judgment, so long as the condemning entity did not 
appeal the final judgment.53 
•	 In South Carolina, courts award attorneys’ fees to the condemnor if the court determines 
that the landowner disputed the right to take in bad faith.54 
•	 In West Virginia, attorneys’ fees are only recoverable if federal funds are used to finance 
the project for which the property is condemned.55 
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A few states do not have legislation regarding an award of attorneys’ fees.56 For example, Connecti-
cut is like Texas in that each party pays its own attorneys’ fees.57 Moreover, a substantial number 
of states across the country use attorneys’ fees to encourage the judicious use of eminent domain 
power and to favor negotiation over litigation. As Texas law currently stands, attorneys’ fees are pri-
marily used to enforce procedural compliance in condemnation proceedings, but are not available 
to a landowner that prevails. 
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COMPENSATION AND VALUATION
A state’s method of determining the value of property is of paramount concern to property owners, 
because land takings through eminent domain are not negotiated between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller. The baseline for determining “just compensation” in an eminent domain case is the 
fair market value of the property. However, the way statutes approach this baseline falls into one of 
three categories: a “Broad Approach,” a “Specific Rates Approach,” and a “Factor-Based Approach.” 
Only two states, Delaware and Georgia, do not address land valuation in their statutes.58 These ap-
proaches reflect the diversity of ideology across various state legislatures.
HOW STATES APPROACH VALUATION
Figure 4
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BROAD INSTRUCTION APPROACH TO VALUATION
Twenty-nine of the fifty U.S. states fall under the Broad Instruction Approach, giving little guidance 
on adequate compensation for condemned land, outside of some version of “fair market value.” 
Specifically, Texas law refers to “local market value” at the time of the taking as the value of just 
compensation for the subject property.59  The term “local market value” is not specifically defined, 
but it does include any injuries or benefits from the condemnation and its effects on the use or 
enjoyment of the parcel.60  The definition of “fair market value,” or as it is in known in some states, 
“just compensation” or “highest and best use,” varies among states, but is generally described as 
the price that would be established between a willing buyer and a willing seller. These are loosely 
defined, general classifications whose meanings are typically interpreted and resolved by courts. 
SPECIFIC RATES APPROACH TO VALUATION
Only a few states use a Specific Rates Approach, and it only applies to certain types of property. 
These statutes reflect a state’s interest in properly valuing certain types of land takings, including 
heritage, homestead, and agricultural land values.
In Missouri, if the property being condemned has been owned by the same family for more than 
fifty years, and the property’s current use would not be feasible after the proposed condemnation, 
then the property has “heritage value.”61 Compensation for a property with heritage value in Mis-
souri is 150% of the fair market value.62  Additionally, small businesses with less than 100 employees 
can also invoke heritage value.63 
A homestead taking occurs when a landowner’s home is being condemned. Missouri further de-
fines a homestead taking to apply when parcels within 300 feet of the landowner’s residence are 
condemned and the condemnation prevents the residence from being used. Missouri compensates 
125% of the fair market value of the property for this type of taking. Similarly, in Indiana, the tak-
ing of a landowner’s residence requires compensation equal to 150% of the fair market value.64
 
Agriculture is another area that receives special attention in some states. Indiana requires condem-
nors to pay 125% of fair market value for agricultural land, or they may “trade” an ownership inter-
est in equal acreage, with the consent of the landowner.65 
Although these rates are tied to “fair market value” it is clear that some states place a premium on 
particular types of land. These statutes are rare among the states. A more common method for valu-
ation is a Factor Based Approach for valuation, which provides guidance for the court determining 
just compensation, but does not set specific rates.
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FACTOR-BASED APPROACH TO VALUATION
A Factor-Based Approach, used by seventeen of the fifty states, strikes a balance between a Broad 
Instruction and a Specific Rates Approach and consists of statutes that provide express consider-
ations in determining compensation. It provides some guidance, but still leaves the courts flexibility 
to determine just compensation. States typically address two general topics using this approach: (1) 
how to value land when the entire parcel is not condemned, and (2) characteristics of property that 
affect value.
If a portion of a property is condemned, leaving a remainder of the property damaged by the ac-
tion, many states account for the damage to the remaining land. In Texas, if only a portion of the 
tract or parcel is condemned, the special commissioners determine damage to both the portion of 
land that is condemned and to the remainder by valuing the entire parcel of land less the portion of 
land being taken. The effect of the taking on the remaining land is then added to the value of the 
damage to the condemned land to determine total damage.66 
Most states approach partial takings in a very similar manner. But what happens if condemnation of 
one portion of the land effectively ruins the practical value of the remainder? One state, Michigan, 
addresses this issue so that if a partial taking would destroy the practical value of the remainder, the 
condemning entity must pay just compensation for the whole parcel.67 
Many states have specifically listed factors that the determining body should consider that affect 
value, including: (1) improvements, (2) growing crops, and (3) goodwill of a business.68  Eleven states 
that mention “improvements” leave the statute very 
open and can include a variety of improvements locat-
ed on the condemned property. Within this category, 
states are split as to whether the final award amount 
“must” or “may” include the value of improvements 
located on the property at the time of the initial con-
demnation action.
California, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming all specify 
that landowners should be compensated for growing 
crops that have not yet been harvested on the prop-
erty to be taken; however, this does not typically include crops that are planted after notice of the 
condemnation action. Additionally, some states account for goodwill of a business and its value to 
taken property. This goodwill is defined as the value of a business because of its location and repu-
tation.
In addition to the general categories noted above, some state statutes include different or notable 
factors for courts to consider when valuing condemned property. For example, courts in Alaska and 
Photo credit: Tave Doty
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Arizona include the cost to build fences and cattle guards if the condemned property is for a rail-
road.  Kansas provides perhaps the most extensive list of factors of any state, including: access to the 
property, aesthetics, and use of the property. In Wyoming, a landlord and tenant of a leasehold can 
determine their respective rights and obligations through their lease, in the event of an eminent 
domain taking. Wyoming also requires a condemnor who acquires an easement on land to return 
the property and improvements, as closely as possible, to pre-condemnation condition.69  
Overall, Texas follows most states in determining land value using a Broad Instruction Approach. 
This approach gives a great degree of latitude to courts as they simply must determine the “fair 
market value” or “just compensation” for a parcel of land.  However, this approach may lead to 
inconsistent valuations across the State because different Special Commissioners may use different 
criteria to determine the final value of the condemned property. A Factor Based or Specific Rates 
approach may be advantageous if Texas policy makers wish to ensure uniformity and protect certain 
property types across the state.
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PRE-CONDEMNATION REQUIREMENTS
One simple fact shows the importance of robust pre-suit procedures: the overwhelming majority of 
properties acquired for public projects never involve a condemnation proceeding. In 2015, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation acquired 317 (25.4%) properties in Texas through condemnation suits 
out of a total 1,249 properties for highway projects.  In 2010, the total was 1,263 with 239 (18.9%) 
taken via condemnation suits. In fact, one regional condemning authority reported that condemna-
tion proceedings are used for less than 5% of the properties it acquires for public projects. It is clear 
that a majority of land taken for public use is acquired through pre-suit negotiation and settlement. 
Without comprehensive and legally enforceable pre-suit procedures, landowners are forced to oper-
ate without the protection of law.70
This section will address the six predominant themes of state eminent domain law relating to pre-
suit condemnation procedure: (1) laws that require the condemnor to contact or notify the land-
owner of the proceedings; (2) laws that require negotiation before a suit can be filed; (3) laws that 
require the disclosure of certain information between the parties; (4) laws that require the condem-
nor to notify landowners of their rights; (5) laws that require settlement offers; and (6) laws that 
enforce the foregoing provisions.
INITIAL CONTACT/NOTICE
Generally, states require some sort of notification to the landowner that his or her land is under 
threat of condemnation. Specific requirements vary across states, but most states require an earnest 
attempt to contact the landowner before filing suit. Twenty-nine states require the condemnor to 
reach out to the landowner before filing suit. 
On the other hand, states that do not require contact with the landowner before the suit—like 
Washington—rely heavily on the court system during all aspects of the condemnation process.71  
In some states, contact with the landowner is a prerequisite to filing suit.72 However, states differ 
greatly in how long prior to suit notice should be delivered to the landowner, ranging from as little 
as twenty days prior to suit73 to as much as ninety days prior to suit.74
These notice requirements protect the landowner by preventing unfair surprise and allow the land-
owner to marshal his or her defense. Of course, contact with the landowner is only the first step in 
the pre-suit procedure. A number of states require more than simply notifying the landowner of the 
pending acquisition of his land. 
NEGOTIATION
Laws in several states require some form of negotiation between the condemnor and the landown-
er. Fourteen states require negotiations to occur with the landowner before the suit can be filed.75  
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However, “negotiation” could technically consist of a single low-ball offer. As a result, many states 
have passed laws requiring good faith offers.76  For example, Texas requires both an initial written 
offer and a final written offer at least thirty days later.77
Condemnors have a financial interest in moving projects forward as quickly as possible. Laws that re-
quire a pause for negotiation encourage more reasonable offers, because they give the condemnor 
an incentive to settle with the landowner quickly in order to get on with the project. 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
Negotiating on equal footing requires at least some disclosure of information. There are many varia-
tions on this theme. Therefore, several states require the condemnor to provide its appraisals to the 
landowner prior to the condemnation hearing.78  For example, New Jersey requires that the parties 
exchange appraisals at least fifteen days before the condemnation hearing.79 Alternatively, some 
states do not require this exchange of information until it is presented at the trial or hearing.80 
 
Written documentation is not the only way that information can be communicated between the 
parties. For instance, several states allow the landowner to accompany the condemnor’s appraiser as 
he or she appraises the property.81  While most states generally allow the landowner to provide his 
own appraiser,82 some states, such as New Mexico, require the parties to appoint a neutral appraiser 
if negotiations break down.83 
Knowing the basis for the condemnor’s valuation of the property ahead of time allows the land-
owner to adequately prepare his or her arguments for court.
NOTICE CONCERNING LANDOWNER’S RIGHTS
Even with a written offer and a copy of the condemnor’s appraisal in hand, an average landowner 
is still unlikely to understand the extent of his rights and options under eminent domain law. To 
this end, a number of states, including Texas, require that a condemnor provide some sort of writ-
ten explanation of eminent domain and the landowner’s rights (in Texas, “The Landowner’s Bill 
of Rights”).84  Montana, for example, provides perhaps the most extensive coverage, requiring the 
condemnor to attach a fifty-nine-page document, titled “Eminent Domain in Montana,” to the con-
demnation complaint, which explains eminent domain and landowner rights.85   
These requirements protect landowners in condemnation proceedings by explaining his or her rights 
and/or obligations, as well as those of the condemnor. This may prevent landowners from being 
disadvantaged by unfamiliarity with the governing laws and regulations.
20
OFFERS
Twenty-four states, including Texas, require that condemning 
authorities provide an offer to landowners prior to filing suit.86  
Thirteen of these states use the amount of this pre-suit offer as 
the benchmark to determine whether to award attorneys’ fees to 
landowners.87  Other states do not allow for recovery of attor-
neys’ fees based on valuation. Oklahoma, for example, considers 
the difference between the condemnor’s offer and the amount 
of the commissioners’ award to determine if attorney’s fees will 
be awarded.88 
ENFORCEMENT
After a state establishes the statutory protections it deems necessary and proper, it must then estab-
lish an effective enforcement mechanism. The award of attorneys’ fees is perhaps the most common 
method of enforcing the protections discussed in this section. 
Notably, enforcement statutes may function so effectively that the enforcement provision is all that 
is required. For example, a handful of states do not require a pre-suit settlement offer by statute. 
However, because those states award attorneys’ fees based on the difference between the final 
judgment and any pre-suit offer, condemnors have just as much incentive to make a pre-suit offer 
as condemnors in states that actually have such a requirement, where condemnors who fail to make 
pre-suit offers are responsible for all of the landowner’s attorneys’ fees, regardless of the ultimate 
award from the court.89 
On the following page are two charts that illustrate some of the required procedures in various states.
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LANDOWNER PROTECTIONS
condemnor lacked authority to condemn
landowner prevails in inverse condemnation
landowner defeats condemnation in whole or in part
notice of rights
accompany
copy of appraisal
calculations
good faIth offer
specific prior notice
fees based on pre-suit offer
notice of rights
accompany
copy of appraisal
calculations
good faIth offer
specific prior notice
fees based on pre-suit offer
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THE PROCEEDINGS
COMMISSIONERS, JURIES, AND COMPLAINT
In general, when a state entity with condemnation authority wishes to condemn a piece of property, 
the entity should negotiate with the landowner before considering condemnation. If the landowner 
refuses to sell the subject property, or the parties disagree as to compensation, the condemnor may 
begin condemnation proceedings. A court will then determine whether the condemnation is proper 
and the amount of compensation owed to the landowner. Condemnation authority and compensa-
tion may be determined in the same or separate phases of hearings, parties may be able to request 
a jury decision, and appellate review is available.
Condemnation proceedings are generally initiated by the condemnor filing a complaint with a speci-
fied court in the county where the property is located. Most states require the condemnor to file 
its complaint in the district or circuit court where the property is located. If the property is located 
in more than one county, states have adopted one or more of three general rules for determining 
the proper court in which the condemnor should file its complaint. When the landowner resides 
on the subject property and the property spans more than one county, Michigan follows the Texas 
approach, which requires the condemnor to file in the county where the landowner resides. If the 
landowner does not reside on the subject property, then many states require the condemnor to file 
in the county where the majority of the property is located. However, Michigan and Alabama allow 
the condemnor to file in any county where any of the property is located when the property spans 
two or more counties.90 
INITIATING CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
The most common points of initiation are: (1) when the complaint is filed with the clerk of the court 
where the condemnation proceeding is to occur, and (2) when notice is given to landowners that 
their property is to be condemned. States vary as to the number of days required between serving 
the landowner with process and setting the condemnation hearing.
In most states, the complaint must identify the condemning parties, the owner(s) of the property to 
be condemned, a description of the property, and the purpose for condemning the property. Devia-
tions from these required components occur most markedly in South Dakota and Montana. In South 
Dakota, the petitioner may file a declaration of taking any time before final judicial determination 
of the parties’ rights when proceedings are against entities engaged in the operation of electric 
utilities, gas utilities, railroads, and coal transportation. 
The complaint must include a declaration of taking, be signed by the petitioner, and declare the 
extent of the property interest to be taken. In these instances, the declaration must contain: (1) a 
statement of authority under which the property interest is taken; (2) a description of the property 
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interest; (3) a legal description of the land; (4) the names of all persons or entities claiming an inter-
est in the lands and a description of the interest claimed by each; (5) a statement by the acquiring 
authority containing an estimate of just compensation for the property interest; and (6) a detailed 
appraisal upon which the amount of petitioner’s deposit was based. When serving a complaint in 
Montana, the condemnor must attach the latest edition of “Eminent Domain in Montana,” which is 
a fifty-nine-page summary of eminent domain law and history in Montana.91 
States have various timelines for initiating eminent domain 
proceedings after landowners have been served with the com-
plaint or notice of condemnation. For example, in Indiana, 
the condemnation action cannot proceed until ten days af-
ter the landowner(s) have been served with process, or, if the 
landowner(s) are unknown or nonresidents of the state, until 
five days after notice has been published for three successive 
weeks in an English-language newspaper in the county where 
the property sits. The clerk of the court will mail notice to non-
residents if their addresses can be obtained through the office of 
the county treasurer. Additionally, in Indiana, the condemnor must serve a written settlement on the 
landowner(s) not later than forty-five days prior to trial. This is similar to Texas’s “final offer,” but 
is counted from the trial date rather than the first offer date. This is the offer that will determine 
whether the landowner is awarded attorneys’ fees after trial.92 
Likely the longest allowable period between filing a complaint for condemnation and the first day 
of condemnation proceedings is in Montana, where the court has six months to begin condemna-
tion proceedings once the complaint is filed in the district court.93 However, a landowner in Wiscon-
sin has twenty days from the date of service of a condemnor’s jurisdictional offer before condemna-
tion proceedings begin.94
COMMISSIONERS COURT – TRADITIONAL CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE
In most states, as in Texas, once condemnation proceedings have been initiated, the commissioners’ 
court typically hears the matter first. However, some states such as Alaska, Michigan, Illinois, Louisi-
ana, New Hampshire, and Washington allow the parties to request a jury hearing, or as in Michigan, 
the court may appoint twelve jurors, rather than commissioners, at its discretion. A typical panel of 
commissioners is made up of three disinterested citizens. Some states require either the commission-
ers or jurors to view the property. For example, in Michigan the commissioners or jurors view the 
property and determine whether the taking is necessary and the amount of just compensation.95
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Some states allow the court to appoint the three commissioners, while others allow each party to 
select one commissioner and the third commissioner is selected by the two commissioners appointed 
by the parties.
 
The commissioners’ court may be given other powers beyond determining necessity of taking and 
just compensation. For example, Maine allows the commissioners court to place terms and restric-
tions on the condemned property’s use. Additionally, Georgia allows the commissioners court to 
subpoena witnesses and compel witnesses to appear at its hearings, as in the Superior Court. In Indi-
ana, when multiple parcels in a county are to be taken for the same public use, the complaints may 
be heard together. The Indiana courts retain the authority to consolidate or separate the actions as 
they see fit for the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.96 
The jury selection approach in Mississippi is different from most states. In Mississippi, the court clerk 
should deliver a copy of the court order fixing the time and place for the hearing to the sheriff and 
the official court reporter. Both the clerk and the sheriff should attend the condemnation hearing. 
The clerk should draw from the court jury box the names of twenty-four jurors. The sheriff should 
then summon the jurors to appear at the time and place designated in the court order.97
When one of the parties is not satisfied with the results of the commissioners’ hearing, that party 
may file to have the matter heard in trial. However, in New York, all condemnation proceedings are 
non-jury trials.98 
EXPEDITED CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
In a limited number of instances, states have adopted procedures for entities to condemn land more 
quickly than usual. The entities allowed to initiate this type of proceeding are typically limited. New 
Mexico and California have the most user-friendly procedures for expedited condemnation proceedings.
New Mexico allows for a Special Alternative Condemnation Procedure that is generally only avail-
able to government entities. The procedure follows the general condemnation proceeding pattern, 
with shortened timelines. The condemnor may file a petition for condemnation in the district court 
where the property is located. The petition must include the condemnor’s authority to condemn and 
the final amount offered to the landowner, and must generally describe the public purpose necessi-
tating condemnation. The court then issues a “notice of condemnation” and a preliminary order of 
condemnation, which grants the condemnor the right to immediately possess the property after de-
positing the final compensation amount. The landowner has ten days to object to the order before 
it becomes permanent. If objections are timely filed, a trial will be held to determine whether the 
condemnation is necessary for the public purpose and to assess just compensation.99
California refers to expedited condemnation proceedings as Urgent Need Condemnation. After fil-
ing the complaint for condemnation, but prior to an entry of judgment, the plaintiff may move the 
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court for an order for possession demonstrating that the plaintiff is entitled to take the property 
by eminent domain and has deposited a satisfactory amount into the court’s register. The motion 
must include the following language and be served to the owner and occupants of the property: 
“You have the right to oppose this motion for an order of possession of your property. If you oppose 
this motion you must serve the plaintiff and file with the court a written opposition to the motion 
within 30 days from the date you were served with this motion.” The court may issue an order of 
possession upon an ex parte application by a water, wastewater, gas, electric, or telephone utility, 
if the court finds an emergency exists and an emergency order of possession will not displace or 
unreasonably affect any person in actual and lawful possession.100
Illinois also allows for quicktake condemnation. Here, condemning authorities with quick-take pow-
ers may file a complaint electing the quicktake procedure. The court then will fix a date no less than 
five days after the filing of the complaint. If the court finds that reasonable necessity exists, it will 
enter an order as to reasonable compensation, and the order is appealable by either party within 
thirty days of the order.101   
APPRAISERS
Most states either do not possess specific requirements for appraisers or they follow the Texas ap-
proach. However, the requirements in Indiana and South Carolina are worth noting.
Like Texas, the court in Indiana appoints three commissioners to assess property value. Two of the 
appraisers must be certified appraisers, and the third appraiser must be a resident of the county in 
which the property interest is located. Unlike Texas, Indiana does not appear to require a commis-
sioners’ hearing—it simply states that the commissioners determine the value of the property and 
file their report. Once they determine fair market value, the appraisers file their report with the 
court, and the clerk sends written notice of the report to all known parties and their attorneys of re-
cord by certified mail. Any party may appeal the appraisers’ valuation, but appeals are accepted no 
later than forty-five days after the report filing. As in Texas, if exceptions are filed, then the matter 
proceeds to trial as in any other civil action.102 
In South Carolina, if the condemnor elects to proceed by way of an appraisal panel, the condem-
nor shall bear the costs of the appraisal panel, which must be a fee of not more than $100 for each 
member plus the actual expenses incurred by the panel. The appraisal panel consists of one member 
appointed by the condemnor, who may not be an employee or former employee of the condemnor; 
one member other than a condemnee in that action, appointed by the landowner; and one member 
who must, as a minimum qualification, possess a South Carolina real estate broker’s license, ap-
pointed by the first two members. The third appointed member must be the chairman of the panel, 
is responsible for convening the panel and reporting its determination to the condemnor, and shall 
receive fifty dollars in additional compensation. Within twenty days of appointing the third mem-
ber, the appraisal panel must conduct an informal proceeding and consider all relevant evidence 
and information to determine the amount of just compensation.103 
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CHALLENGES AND APPEALS
Appeals and challenges to final decisions are allowed in many states. Some states allow these ap-
peals to be based on the amount of damages awarded and/or the necessity of taking the land. Some-
times, the scope of review on appeal will be limited to certain subjects. The right to bring an appeal or 
challenge is usually barred after a certain number of days. Some states will not stop proceedings in the 
original action in the case of an appeal, thus allowing simultaneous proceedings to occur.
Typically, landowners are allowed thirty days to appeal compensation awards after a determina-
tion has been made. There are variations, as in Michigan, which allow the time for challenging to 
be specified in the complaint. Wisconsin gives the landowner six months to appeal a jurisdictional 
offer, even if the landowner has accepted the offer. Additionally, Wisconsin allows a party to appeal 
a commissioner’s award sixty days from the day of its filing. Massachusetts has one of the lengthier 
time frames for challenging an offer; any party may file a complaint within three years after the tak-
ing has been recorded. Also, a landowner is not barred from appeal if he takes settlement funds.104
States vary as to what can be reviewed on appeal. Some states, such as Louisiana, will only allow the 
judgment to be reviewed. New York limits the scope of the review to the constitutionality of the 
proceeding, the statutory or jurisdictional authority of the condemnor, adherence to the procedure 
set forth in the condemnation statute, and the validity of the proposed public use. Other states, 
such as California, allow the landowner to appeal on the grounds that the plaintiff is not authorized 
by statute to exercise the power of eminent domain for the purpose stated in the complaint. Addi-
tionally, the landowner can object that the stated purpose is not a public use, or that the property is 
not subject to acquisition by the power of eminent domain.105 
POSSESSION AND RIGHTS TO ENTER LAND
There is much variation among the states as to when a condemnor can take possession, and whether 
the landowner can do anything to delay possession. Many states allow for the condemnor to take 
possession after a compensation award regardless of whether the landowner will appeal the deci-
sion or not. Many of these states require only that the compensation be paid for the condemnor to 
take possession. 
Some states allow issuance of a court order fixing the terms of possession. For example, Alaska al-
lows the court to fix the time during which the parties can take possession and when the landowner 
is required to surrender possession. Hawaii allows the court to grant possession to the condemnor at 
any time after the summons is served. The order must be in the form of a motion stating the reasons 
why immediate occupation of the land is necessary, and the approximate value of compensation as 
estimated by the condemnor. The court must also issue an order to the landowner requiring them 
to respond or appear and show cause as to why the motion to grant possession should not be ap-
proved. Colorado only allows the condemnor to possess the property when the court issues an order 
and compensation has been paid to the landowner.106
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Alaska does not allow the condemnor to take possession until after the time for the landowner to 
file an objection has run. If the landowner does file an objection, then the condemnor cannot take 
possession until the hearing on the objection has taken place. Michigan allows for interim posses-
sion; meaning, if a reasonable need is shown, possession can be granted even if the final appeal has 
not been decided.107  The State of New York, when acting as a condemnor, may take possession as 
soon as an appropriation map is filed with the County Clerk. There is no requirement that a hearing 
or any formal proceeding take place in order for title to vest.108  
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WHO HAS AUTHORITY TO CONDEMN?
The power to take private property for public use is only available to entities upon which the state 
has properly conferred condemnation authority. Texas does not specifically address who has the au-
thority to condemn within the Texas Property Code. However, the Texas Comptroller’s Office keeps 
an updated list of entities’ condemnation applications and registrations. Most states have general 
provisions addressing condemnation authority similar to Texas, but these provisions may be more 
narrow or broad.
NARROW AUTHORITY TO CONDEMN PROVISIONS
Montana’s eminent domain provisions are much stricter than Texas’s. 
There, a strong presumption exists against allowing condemnors to 
obtain unfettered title by purchasing land outright. The Montana 
Code presumes an easement is sufficient, unless the public use is for 
a highway or the condemning entity has a compelling reason requir-
ing purchase of the entire property interest.
 
The Montana Constitution states that the possession and protection 
of property is an inalienable right. The Montana Supreme Court 
has interpreted this clause to mean that eminent domain infringes 
on the fundamental rights of landowners bestowed by the state’s constitution. In furtherance of this 
protection, the authority to condemn requires express legislative approval, and such approval must 
conform to the strict guidelines of Montana’s constitution.109
Many states, including Virginia, provide explicit restrictions confining authority to utility companies, 
common carriers, and railroad companies when those entities provide utility, common carrier, or rail-
road services, respectively. Typically, taking or damaging private property is not public use if the pri-
mary use is private gain, private benefit, private enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, 
or economic development, except for eliminating a public nuisance existing on the property. There 
is no presumption of public use, and the condemnor bears the burden of proving public use.110 
Other states, while not as strict as Montana, still provide restrictions. In Georgia, the Georgia Land 
Bank Authorities do not have condemnation authority, and soil and water conservation districts 
need 90% voluntary land acquisition for a small watershed project before condemning the remain-
ing 10%.111 States with narrow condemnation authority may restrict use of eminent domain by 
private companies and common carriers. In Kentucky, pipeline companies not regulated by Ken-
tucky’s Public Service Commission lack eminent domain authority.112  South Carolina has taken a 
unique temporal approach to affording eminent domain authority to for-profit pipelines. For profit 
oil pipelines, which include all publicly traded oil companies, do not have eminent domain authority 
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in the State.113 However, this provision is only applicable for three years and will be revisited by the 
South Carolina General Assembly in 2019.
States, including Texas, generally give “common carriers” the condemnation authority.114 In Texas, 
an entity merely checks a box on a form, but other states offer a more strict approach.115  For ex-
ample, in Missouri, all motor carriers, contract carriers, and express companies are excluded from 
being considered common carriers for eminent domain purposes.116  States may limit the number of 
common carriers by creating a rigorous application process to become a common carrier.
BROAD AUTHORITY TO CONDEMN PROVISIONS
By contrast, some states enjoy seemingly greater eminent domain authority than Texas. For ex-
ample, Maryland’s States Road Commission and the City of Baltimore may condemn without going 
through the full negotiation, appraisal, valuation, and hearing procedure required of most enti-
ties.117 Although the landowner may appeal the fair value, this provision gives great leeway to both 
the State’s Road Commission and the City of Baltimore to bypass many hurdles other entities en-
counter.
In addition, states such as New Mexico and Hawaii grant more broad eminent domain discretion 
than Texas. However, the New Mexico Cultural Properties Review Committee may condemn cultur-
ally or historically significant private land and buildings to be held in trust by the state. In addition, 
corporations in Hawaii involved in water irrigation may exercise eminent domain if the corporation 
has at least $50,000 in cash or has tangible property with market value equal to the amount the 
corporation values the condemned property as an asset.118 
Alabama provides a special provision granting condemnation authority specifically to the University 
of Alabama, Auburn University, and Montevallo University. Similarly, New Jersey provides an even 
broader provision stating that all State Colleges are specifically granted the right to condemn.119 
AUTHORITY GRANTED BY SPECIAL REVIEW BOARDS
In Texas, the Public Utility Commission may confer eminent domain to utilities through a Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity. Many states have similar review boards with broad discretion to 
confer an authority to condemn. For example, the Iowa Utilities Board can confer condemnation 
authority for electric power generating plants, electric transmission lines, intrastate natural gas 
pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and telephone and telegraph companies by granting a Certifi-
cate of Public Convenience Use and Necessity, a permit, or a franchise.120  Much like Texas, the Iowa 
Public Utility Commission has considerable discretion in deciding whether to confer eminent domain 
authority. If the condemning authority can show the use of the land is a reasonable and beneficial 
public use of the property, then the Commission may decide to grant authority. What is considered 
public use, and how states define it is discussed at length in a later section. 
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AUTHORITY GRANTED BY STATE GOVERNOR
A few states skirt creating a commission to oversee granting eminent domain authority, and af-
ford the governor of the state that power. Alabama, South Dakota, and Massachusetts grant their 
Governor great discretion in deciding whether to grant eminent domain authority. In Alabama, if 
a corporation, person, or association seeks to obtain private property using eminent domain, but is 
afforded no lawful recourse for the taking, then a written direction by the Governor to the attorney 
of record is sufficient authority for bringing the suit. In South Dakota, a railroad company, while 
granted authority under statute, still must obtain permission from either the Governor or the com-
mission board if the project is consistent with the state’s public necessity requirement. Similarly, in 
Massachusetts, where there is no other provision by law, the Governor may institute a taking by or 
on behalf of the State so long as it meets the public necessity requirement.121
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THE STANDARD OF PUBLIC USE
To determine the purposes of private property takings, many states rely on the term “public use.” 
In Kelo v. City of New London, the United States Supreme Court upheld tangential economic ben-
efits as a public use under the Fifth Amendment. In this case, the City of New London approved a 
development plan that would generate hundreds of jobs and grow the city’s tax revenues. The city 
purchased land from owners willing to sell and intended to exercise eminent domain authority to 
take the rest. City residents of the condemned land—some of whom had lived there for almost 100 
years—challenged the City’s authority.122 
Although the Supreme Court decided Kelo, this signaled only the beginning of an evolving set of 
tensions across the United States over defining “public use.” Following Kelo, many state legislatures 
either broadly outlawed eminent domain for economic development or enumerated specific autho-
rized public uses. 
Texas responded strongly to Kelo in 2005 by enacting §2206.001, which provides that no entity may 
take private land if the taking (1) confers a private benefit; (2) has a public use that is mere pretext; 
(3) is for the purpose of economic development, unless the economic development is a secondary 
benefit resulting from urban renewal; and (4) is not for public use.123 Texas also defines public use in 
the state constitution and expressly excludes the transfer of private property to a private entity for 
the primary purpose of economic development or increasing tax base.124
To more accurately define public use in the broader context of the United States, this section discuss-
es how different states respond to (1) the challenge of private, for-profit entities seeking eminent 
domain authority and (2) issues of public use raised by pipeline companies.
“Economic development” provisions vary substantially by state. Some states, like Florida,125  have all 
but banned transferring condemned property to private entities for economic development.126 Oth-
ers, such as Missouri and Vermont, prohibit the taking of land “primarily” or “solely” for economic 
development.  Texas, like most other states, prohibits taking property for economic development. 
However, if this development is secondary to alleviating harm to society from blighted property, 
then economic development is permitted.127 
Several states restrict or prohibit transferring condemned property to another person or private entity. 
Delaware, for instance, requires proof of public use by clear and convincing evidence before allowing 
a property transfer to a private entity under eminent domain.128  Additionally, Florida requires a three-
fifths vote from both houses of the legislature before eminent domain can be exercised to benefit a 
private party.129  These states generally favor the landowner and disfavor eminent domain benefiting a 
private party, even if the public might also benefit from the taking. Texas is one of these states.
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The Texas Constitution specifically excludes from “public use” taking private property under emi-
nent domain if the primary purpose is economic development or increasing tax revenue. Compared 
with some states, this prohibition is moderately restrictive. It leaves the door open for the eminent 
domain authority to articulate some other plausible “primary” purpose. In order to restrict this 
authority further, the Texas legislature now prohibits taking private property if it benefits a private 
party through the property’s use.130 
Despite these common protections, states must also note that private entities often use land for sub-
stantial public benefit. This balance is reflected in states that carve out statutory exceptions allowing 
some private entities to take land under eminent domain, or be given land by some other eminent 
domain authority. The three most common situations are utilities, oil and gas pipelines, and blight.
Public utilities provide a valuable service to the public, but are often privately owned. Should private 
property be taken and given to these private entities to facilitate running power lines, water, or 
sewer? The overwhelming majority of states answer in the affirmative, allowing public utilities—
even if privately owned—to benefit from an eminent domain taking. Thirty-nine state legislatures 
have expressly addressed utilities in their eminent domain statutes. 
The exact provisions vary, but generally fall into two categories. Some legislatures have exempted 
utilities from the “economic development” restrictions on eminent domain use.131  Other states 
give certain utilities express eminent domain authority to take private property; this authorization 
trumps other restrictions on taking.132  States not expressly giving utilities power to take private 
property require the utility to obtain a certificate from the State public utility agency to condemn 
property.133  So, even states that do not expressly endorse utilities as a “public use” allow utilities to 
take private property under some circumstances. Utilities and oil and gas can either be exempt from 
a prohibition on private takings or given blanket eminent domain authority. Some states either do 
not mention utilities, or require them to obtain permission from a court or administrative agency to 
use eminent domain; therefore, it is not a statutory exception.
Thirty-four states allow the government to condemn private property and then transfer it to a 
private entity or sell it to a developer for economic development. Most commonly, state statutes 
exempt blighted property from the “economic development” restrictions. However, the state may 
enact other conditions or restrictions on takings of blighted property for economic development.134  
A second method, used to narrow the taking of blighted property, requires a heightened burden of 
proof. Before taking blighted property, the developer or agency must show public use by clear and 
convincing evidence (a higher burden of proof than “preponderance of the evidence”).135  Lastly, 
some legislatures require a specific health and safety threat before condemning blighted property 
for redevelopment.136
Texas has exempted utilities and oil and gas pipelines from the State’s “economic development” and 
“transfer to a private party” restrictions, whose eminent domain authority are enumerated by other 
33
statutes. Interestingly, Texas has a split blight exception. An eminent domain authority may take 
blighted property for economic development, but not necessarily for transfer to another private 
party.137  Just how effective are the Texas statutory restrictions? That may remain an open question, 
as somewhere between 1,600138 and 6,000139 entities (including counties, school districts, etc.) possess 
or have claimed eminent domain authority in Texas.
Enshrined here is the understanding that absolute private ownership may conflict with—and some-
times be subordinate to—the public good.140 Each state has its own ongoing struggle to find the 
right balance between these two interests because private ownership and public benefit are by no 
means the same thing. 
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ABANDONMENT
Across the nation, abandonment occurs in two general contexts with respect to eminent domain or 
condemnation proceedings. The condemnor abandons the project when it withdraws from the con-
demnation proceedings (“dismissal of proceedings”), and when it doesn’t use the land for the public 
use project for which it was taken (“abandonment of public purpose”). Many states have statutory 
provisions to discourage either type of abandonment, although the remedies for dismissal are gen-
erally more substantial than the remedies available for outright abandonment.
Some states provide remedies to landowners upon dismissal of the proceedings. These remedies 
include reimbursement to the landowner of reasonable attorney’s fees; reimbursement of appraisal 
fees and engineering fees actually incurred; a reverter of the land; or a combination of any of these 
remedies. Other states provide remedies or repurchase rights for land taken then later abandoned 
by the condemnor. These remedies vary depending on the state but tend to include either an origi-
nal landowner’s right to repurchase, an automatic termination of easements, automatic re-vesting 
of title, or an option to purchase by other parties such as adjoining landowners, municipalities, or 
other parties interested in public use development.
This section expounds on the laws of the states regarding dismissal of proceedings and abandon-
ment of public purpose. The analysis below also provides further insight into the similarities and 
differences between abandonment statutes in the fifty states as compared to Texas.  It is important 
to note that eleven out of the fifty states do not have statutory provisions addressing abandonment 
in either context.141
DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS
The condemnor may withdraw from condemnation proceedings in three ways: (1) the condem-
nor files a motion to dismiss the proceedings; (2) the final judgment states that petitioner cannot 
acquire the land by condemnation; or (3) the condemnor fails to pay the judgment within a certain 
period of time.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Many states, including Texas, hold a condemnor liable for some of all the landowner’s incurred 
expenses if the condemnor moves to dismiss the proceedings. In several states, the condemnor 
must reimburse the landowner for all reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees incurred 
following a voluntary dismissal of eminent domain proceedings.142  Not all states are this compre-
hensive, however. In Wisconsin, for instance, a condemnor who dismisses the proceedings is only 
responsible for attorneys’ fees.143  Michigan has a similar law regarding reimbursement for reason-
able expenses, but requires that the owners of the property reasonably relied on the condemning 
authority’s good faith written offer in incurring those expenses.144 
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FAILURE TO COMPENSATE THE LANDOWNER
Other states allow the landowner to vacate the condemnation judgment if a condemnor fails to 
make full payment of the judgment within a certain period of time. On the other hand, in Florida, 
if the condemnor fails to make the payment within twenty days, the final judgment is null and void, 
unless the court finds good cause to grant the condemnor an extension of up to sixty days to pay 
the judgment. If the proceedings are dismissed following failure to make payment, the landowner 
can generally recover reasonable costs, including attorney’s fees in some states.145 
Because the condemnation is a civil proceeding, most states allow a condemning authority to with-
draw from condemnation proceedings at any point before a final judgment is rendered. Some states 
expressly prohibit withdrawal from an eminent domain proceeding once a final judgment has been 
reached. However, some states provide more leeway, giving a condemnor thirty days after the final 
judgment to withdraw from the proceedings. One of those states, California, limits the thirty-day al-
lowance if the landowner has justifiably relied on the proceeding and therefore cannot be restored 
to substantially the same position. Furthermore, in the event of a dismissal in California, the land-
owner is entitled to any ad valorem taxes, penalties, and costs on the property for which he or she 
would be liable. In New Jersey, a condemnation proceeding can be abandoned at any time by agree-
ment of the parties, but if the condemnor dismisses the suit within the thirty days after judgment is 
entered, the condemnor is liable for all the landowner’s expenses.146 
A number of states, however, place stricter limits on condemnors. For instance, several states prohib-
it a condemnor from abandoning a condemnation proceeding once a declaration of taking was filed 
or after the plaintiff has taken possession (some, like South Carolina, prohibit withdrawal once the 
condemnor has taken possession and made material alterations to the property.)147  While not pro-
hibiting abandonment outright, Nevada awards damages to the landowner from the condemnor’s 
occupancy if the condemnor occupies the property and then abandons the proceedings.148  These 
statutes and the other prohibitions on abandonment of the proceedings serve to hold condemnors 
to the public purpose they claimed in exercising eminent domain over private property. Rhode 
Island also places limits on a condemnor’s ability to abandon the proceedings. There, the condemnor 
may withdraw from the condemnation proceedings at any time before a final court determination 
is made regarding damages.149  Not only will the condemnor owe all costs and expenses upon such 
withdrawal, but title to the property will automatically revert to the landowner.150 
Although many states have such statutory protections in place, some states do not hold condemnors 
liable for the landowner’s expenses upon withdrawal from condemnation proceedings. For example, 
in Massachusetts, a city may abandon land with no additional recourse to the prior owner. In Arkan-
sas, a levee or drainage district may refuse to pay the final judgment award, abandon the line, and 
relocate without being liable for any award or judgment rendered in any proceeding for the con-
demnation right-of-way, except as to those specific costs.
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Overall, most states hold a condemnor who withdraws from a condemnation proceeding respon-
sible to reimburse the landowner. Many states take the same approach as Texas, and require aban-
doning condemnors to pay landowners for incurred attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees. This 
seems to reflect a general desire to include a statutory remedy that protects landowners by holding 
condemnors to the public purpose they relied on in order to exercise the power of eminent domain.
ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC PURPOSE
What if a condemnor goes through with the condemnation proceeding, but then fails to use the 
property for the alleged public use? Many states have statutory provisions that touch on the conse-
quences resulting from a condemnor who abandons the purpose for which the land was acquired, 
including easements. Failure to use the land for the purpose in which it was acquired is not aban-
donment of the land per se because the condemnor still owns the property interest it condemned. A 
majority of states, however, consider this “abandonment” of the property and have enacted statu-
tory provisions to address this situation.
Some states, including Texas, provide a set period of non-use after which the law considers the 
public use abandoned, while other states consider the public use abandoned whenever the land is 
no longer being used for the purpose in which it was acquired. In Texas, a person having real prop-
erty interest in the land which was condemned has a right to repurchase the land ten years after the 
date of acquisition, if no progress has been made, if the project no longer needs the land, or if the 
project is cancelled. Some states have similar ten-year “waiting periods.”151 Other states have shorter 
periods, allowing landowners to repurchase land sooner than ten years if the condemnor abandons 
the public use, generally ranging from six to eight years.152 
After six to ten years, property values naturally change. Many states address the question of re-
purchase price by statute. Texas, for instance, allows the landowner to repurchase the land for the 
amount originally paid for it, while others set the repurchase price as the condemnation price plus a 
percent per annum.153  Unlike Texas, there are states which provide remedies for non-use of land or 
easements but without a set period of time in which the non-use must occur. This means that aban-
donment may be found regardless of whether the non-use occurs several months or several years 
after the taking.
Repurchase by the landowner is the most common, but not the only, result of abandonment of the 
condemned property. For example, if property is abandoned after six years in Indiana, a forfeiture 
action may be brought either by a person with a legal interest in the property or some other party 
with a public use interest in the property (another potential condemnor, in other words).154 Some 
states’ laws are stricter and automatically terminate the condemned easement or revert title to the 
original landowner.155  On the other hand, the laws in some states are silent or ambiguous as to 
what happens if a condemnor abandons the public use of the property.156
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Other states stand alone in their approaches to abandonment. In Montana, for example, an aban-
doned easement automatically reverts to the original landowner, but if the condemnor took full 
title to the parcel of land and abandoned it, the landowner only receives the right to repurchase the 
land by matching the highest bid at auction. Alternatively, in Rhode Island a condemnor may, with 
the permission of the State properties committee, convey, sell, or lease property no longer needed 
for a public use. The landowner, however, retains a right of first refusal.157  Finally, South Dakota’s 
abandonment statutes require a railroad that abandons a project to resolve title claims within one 
year, or title reverts back to the landowner or municipality.158
In summary, the majority of states provide procedures and remedies available in the event of an 
abandonment of the public purpose for which land was acquired. While few states track Texas law 
exactly, many have only slight differences—mainly the period of time required for non-use to be 
deemed abandonment—and most allow some form of repurchase right to the landowner.
ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC PURPOSE
condemnor lacked authority to condemn
landowner prevails in inverse condemnation
landowner defeats condemnation in whole or in part
specific period of non-use
repurchase right
other remedy
land only
easement only
both land and easement
specific period of non-use
repurchase right
other remedy
land only
easement only
both land and easement
Figure 6
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UNIQUE FEATURES FROM AROUND THE UNITED STATES
There are some unique laws in individual states that, while not fitting into any of the trends dis-
cussed above, are worth taking into consideration.
BLANKET EASEMENTS 
Missouri provides that blanket easements are void for public policy reasons. A blanket easement is 
an easement where the terms are not specific regarding the location of facilities on, over, under, or 
across the burdened property.168
EXPANDED USE TRIGGERS NEW PROCEEDING
In Missouri, a new condemnation proceeding must take place if the condemnor uses the condemned 
property in a manner inconsistent with the easement or other instrument of conveyance. This is 
known as an “expanded use.” Expanded use occurs when the condemnor uses an area greater than 
what was described in the instrument, for a different use than described, or in a way that has an 
unreasonably burdensome impact on the property or landowner.169 
UNIQUE LANDOWNER RESOURCES
Missouri also allows the landowner, after receiving the initial offer, to submit an alternative location 
to be condemned which the condemnor must consider. If the condemnor decides against the land-
owner’s alternative location, the condemnor must provide the reasoning behind that decision.170
 
Finally, the office of public counsel in Missouri must create an office of ombudsman for property 
rights by appointing a person to the position of ombudsman. The ombudsman assists citizens by 
providing non-legal guidance regarding the condemnation process and procedures. The ombuds-
man also documents the use of eminent domain within the state as well as any issues associated 
with its use and must submit a yearly report to the general assembly.171
ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR RELOCATION
In Pennsylvania, displaced homeowners are entitled to receive up to $31,000 for costs associated 
with terminating an existing mortgage, purchasing an equivalent replacement home, and increased 
mortgage interest expenses. Additionally, renters are eligible to receive up to $7,200 for increased 
rental expenses. Pennsylvanians who have been displaced following a condemnation proceeding are 
entitled to reimbursement for moving expenses.172 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS ON OIL AND GAS CONDEMNORS
In Maryland, if land is condemned for a gas pipeline, the pipeline must transmit gas to local consum-
ers and offer to contract with those consumers. Further, if land is condemned for an oil pipeline, the 
pipeline’s condemnation authority is limited to select counties.173
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THE JURY CAN TAKE A LOOK
Alabama allows the court to take the jury to view the property that is sought to be taken. The 
parties can attend, but the judge is the only one allowed to make a statement to the jury, and the 
statement must be transcribed.174 
LANDOWNER INVOLVEMENT TO MITIGATE HARM 
In Montana, there is a balancing test used to determine the best location for condemnation on a 
landowner’s property. This process allows the landowner to be involved in the planning stages of 
the project, once condemnation has occurred, in an effort to mitigate the harm to his or her land.
CONDEMNATION FOR PRESERVATION
In New Mexico, the State may condemn private land or buildings that are “culturally or historically 
significant” as well as land near highways to “preserve scenic beauty.”175 
RELIEF FROM PREPAYMENT PENALTIES OF MORTGAGES
In South Carolina, the government must pay or reimburse the landowner any prepayment penalties 
for mortgages that arise because of the taking in an eminent domain case. The government is given 
a credit against taxes due during the year in which it acquires the landowner’s property, but the 
government also has the responsibility of paying taxes on the property for that year.176 
Similarly, in Oklahoma, property owners are eligible for reimbursement of prepayment penalties for 
any pre-existing recorded mortgage on the property taken.177
INCREASED SCRUTINY FOR PIPELINES
In Vermont, the routing and construction of oil and gas pipelines is 
highly regulated at the state level. Technical and non-technical pub-
lic hearings must be held and the Public Service Board must grant 
the certification of public good before construction can begin. The 
Board cannot grant the certification if it interferes with municipal 
plans or negatively affects aesthetics, historic sites, air and water 
purity, the natural environment, the use of natural resources, or the 
public health and safety.178
The Board must also look at economic costs of the pipeline and 
determine whether there is a benefit to the State and its residents. After the certificate of public good 
is granted, the pipeline company can move on to the condemnation procedure if they were unable to 
negotiate a sale with the landowner.179
DELAYED POSSESSION
In Wisconsin, if a utility applies to condemn land, and the utility is unlikely to commence the project 
within two years, the landowner retains possession of the land until the utility begins construction.180 
Photo credit: Tave Doty
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE STATUTES
1. ABANDONMENT
“When an interest, other than a fee simple interest, in property that has been acquired for a 
public purpose by right of eminent domain, or otherwise, is abandoned or when the purpose for 
which it was acquired is terminated, the property reverts to the original owner or the original 
owner’s successor in interest.181
2. COMPENSATION
BROAD INSTRUCTION APPROACH
“The fair market value as used in this chapter shall be defined as the price the property would 
bring when offered for sale by a willing seller who is not forced to sell and which is sought by a 
willing buyer who is not required to buy, after due consideration of all the elements affecting 
value.”182 
SPECIFIC RATES APPROACH
“...[A] condemnor that acquires a parcel of real property through the exercise of eminent domain 
under this chapter shall compensate the owner of the parcel as follows:
(1) For agricultural land:
(A) either:
(i) payment to the owner equal to one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the fair mar-
ket value of the parcel as determined under IC 32-24-1; or
(ii) upon the request of the owner and if the owner and condemnor both agree, transfer 
to the owner of an ownership interest in agricultural land that is equal in acreage to the 
parcel acquired through the exercise of eminent domain;
(B) payment of any other damages determined under IC 32-24-1 and any loss incurred in a 
trade or business that is attributable to the exercise of eminent domain; and
(C) payment of the owner’s relocation costs, if any.
(2) For a parcel of real property occupied by the owner as a residence:
(A) payment to the owner equal to one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the fair market value 
of the parcel as determined under IC 32-24-1;
(B) payment of any other damages determined under IC 32-24-1 and any loss incurred in a 
trade or business that is attributable to the exercise of eminent domain; and
(C) payment of the owner’s relocation costs, if any.
(3) For a parcel of real property not described in subdivision (1) or (2):
(A) payment to the owner equal to one hundred percent (100%) of the fair market value of 
the parcel as determined under IC 32-24-1;
(B) payment of any other damages determined under IC 32-24-1 and any loss incurred in a 
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trade or business that is attributable to the exercise of eminent domain; and
(C) payment of the owner’s relocation costs, if any.”183 
FACTORS APPROACH
 “(d) Factors to be considered. In ascertaining the amount of compensation and damages, the 
following nonexclusive list of factors shall be considered if such factors are shown to exist. Such 
factors are not to be considered as separate items of damages, but are to be considered only as 
they affect the total compensation and damage under the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of 
this section. Such factors are:
(1) The most advantageous use to which the property is reasonably adaptable.
(2) Access to the property remaining.
(3) Appearance of the property remaining, if appearance is an element of value in connection 
with any use for which the property is reasonably adaptable.
(4) Productivity, convenience, use to be made of the property taken, or use of the property re-
maining.
(5) View, ventilation and light, to the extent that they are beneficial attributes to the use of 
which the remaining property is devoted or to which it is reasonably adaptable.
(6) Severance or division of a tract, whether the severance is initial or is in aggravation of a 
previous severance; changes of grade and loss or impairment of access by means of underpass or 
overpass incidental to changing the character or design of an existing improvement being con-
sidered as in aggravation of a previous severance, if in connection with the taking of additional 
land and needed to make the change in the improvement.
(7) Loss of trees and shrubbery to the extent that they affect the value of the land taken, and to 
the extent that their loss impairs the value of the land remaining.
(8) Cost of new fences or loss of fences and the cost of replacing them with fences of like quality, 
to the extent that such loss affects the value of the property remaining.
(9) Destruction of a legal nonconforming use.
(10) Damage to property abutting on a right-of-way due to change of grade where accompa-
nied by a taking of land.
(11) Proximity of new improvement to improvements remaining on condemnee’s land.
(12) Loss of or damage to growing crops.
(13) That the property could be or had been adapted to a use which was profitably carried on.
(14) Cost of new drains or loss of drains and the cost of replacing them with drains of like qual-
ity, to the extent that such loss affects the value of the property remaining.
(15) Cost of new private roads or passageways or loss of private roads or passageways and the 
cost of replacing them with private roads or passageways of like quality, to the extent that such 
loss affects the value of the property remaining.”184 
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PAYMENT TIMELINE
Example statute from Alabama: 
“(a) If the plaintiff fails to make full payment of the judgment, or of the full amount awarded for 
any separate item or parcel of property described therein, within [90 days after the assessment 
thereof,] the defendant may treat the failure to make payment as an abandonment of the con-
demnation action with respect to the property for which payment has not been made, and may 
move to vacate the judgment and for a dismissal...”185 
OR stricter example statue from Florida:
“Within 20 days after the rendition of the judgment, the petitioner shall deposit the amount set 
forth therein into the registry of the court for the use of the defendants, or the proceeding shall be 
null and void, unless for good cause further time, not exceeding 60 days, is allowed by the court.”186 
 
3. PUBLIC USE
Texas falls in line with most of the country with respect to public use. The most relevant statute for 
Texas is Gov’t Code Ann. § 2206.001. “(b) A governmental or private entity may not take private 
property through the use of eminent domain if the taking: (1) confers a private benefit on a par-
ticular private party through the use of the property; (2) is for a public use that is merely a pretext 
to confer a private benefit on a particular private party; (3) is for economic development purposes, 
unless the economic development is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal community 
development or municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on 
society from slum or blighted areas) and (This section does not affect the authority of an entity 
authorized by law to take private property through the use of eminent domain for: (1) transpor-
tation projects, including, but not limited to, railroads, airports, or public roads or highways; (2) 
entities authorized under Section 59, Article XVI, Texas Constitution, including: (A) port authorities; 
(B) navigation districts; and (C) any other conservation or reclamation districts that act as ports; (3) 
water supply, wastewater, flood control, and drainage projects; (4) public buildings, hospitals, and 
parks; (5) the provision of utility services; (6) a sports and community venue project approved by 
voters at an election held on or before December 1, 2005, under Chapter 334 or 335, Local Govern-
ment Code; (7) the operations of: (A) a common carrier pipeline; or (B) an energy transporter, as 
that term is defined by Section 186.051, Utilities Code; (8) a purpose authorized by Chapter 181, 
Utilities Code; (9) underground storage operations subject to Chapter 91, Natural Resources Code; 
(10) a waste disposal project; or (11) a library, museum, or related facility and any infrastructure 
related to the facility.187
Deleware statute:
(a) The policy of the provisions of this chapter pertaining to eminent domain is to ensure that 
eminent domain is used for a limited, defined public use. Public use does not include the gen-
eration of public revenues, increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment or economic health, 
through private land owners or economic development.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither this State nor any political subdivision 
thereof nor any other condemning agency, including an agency as defined in § 9501(b) of this 
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title, shall use eminent domain other than for a public use, as defined in subsection (c) of this section.
(c) The term “public use” shall only mean:
(1) The possession, occupation, or utilization of land by the general public or by public agencies;
(2) The use of land for the creation or functioning of public utilities, electric cooperatives, or com-
mon carriers, or
(3) Where the exercise of eminent domain:
a.1. Removes a “blighted area” as defined at § 4501(3) of Title 31, or a “slum area”, as defined 
at § 4501(23) of Title 31;
2. Removes a structure that is beyond repair or unfit for human habitation or use; or
3. Is used to acquire abandoned real property; and
b. Eliminates a direct threat to public health and safety caused by or related to the real prop-
erty in its current condition.
(d) Whenever real property is condemned and will be used, including owned, occupied or devel-
oped by a private party, the State or agency thereof or a political subdivision must establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that the use of eminent domain complies with the definition of 
“public use” in subsection (c) of this section.
(e) “No written notice or correspondence shall be sent to property owners from the State, an 
agency or a political subdivision communicating to the property owner that the real property is 
subject to eminent domain without the State, an agency, or a political subdivision first notifying 
the property owner in writing of the public use as defined in subsection (c) of this section and as 
required by § 9505(15) of this title.”188
Public Use
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any condemnation action, without the consent 
of the owner of the property, the burden of proof is on the condemning entity to demonstrate, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the taking of private property is for a public use, unless 
the condemnation action involves a taking for the eradication of blight, in which case the burden 
of proof is on the condemning entity to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
taking of the property is necessary for the eradication of blight.”189
  
4. WHAT CANNOT BE CONDEMNED
“(B.) The power of eminent domain shall not be used for the siting or building of wind turbines on 
private property.”190
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